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Abstract
Security studies literature neglects social media’s potential for lay actors to become 
influential within security debates. This article develops the concept of ‘security 
influencers’, bringing literature from marketing into the security debate to understand 
how social media enables individuals to ‘speak’ and contest security and how lay actors 
exert influence. Methodologically, this article applies a multi-methods approach to 
27,367 tweets to identify and analyse the top four most influential actors in 48 hours 
following the 2017 bombings by keywords ‘Manchester’ and ‘Muslims’. This article 
builds a typology of security influencers nuancing definitions of the passive ‘security 
broadcaster’ and the active ‘security engager’, both of which emerge from obscurity 
or influence within non-security domains. Furthermore, a dichotomy emerges within 
influential messages and contestation; messages discussing Muslims in banal terms as 
diverse individuals register high levels of agreement, whereas those discussing Islam as 
a world religion receive more hostility and contestation.
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Introducing security, influencers and Manchester
On the 22nd of May 2017, a British man, Salman Abedi, detonated a suicide bomb in the 
Manchester Arena re-igniting debates about counterterrorism and radicalisation (Hedges, 
2017) and presenting multiple discursive implications for existing debates. Prior UK 
constructions of British Muslims had been dominated by integration and security con-
cerns (Poole, 2002; Saeed, 2007; Sian et al., 2012) for more than a decade in light of 9/11 
and the war on terror. However, the media landscape had shifted since previous attacks 
with the Manchester bombing occurring in the social media era and not requiring indi-
viduals wishing to debate to wait for newspaper editorials, nor academic and policy lit-
erature that trickled out in the following years. Users could take to social media platforms, 
like Twitter, immediately after the attack. Such immediacy and the democratic nature of 
social media challenges established bodies of security scholarship; moreover, social 
media itself remains under theorised within constructivist discussions.
The elite centric Copenhagen School (Buzan et al., 1997) defined the discursive turn 
in security studies by introducing constructivism to questions of threat emergence. Here, 
elites competed to structure security debates and threats and move issues between emer-
gency and non-emergency politics. However, the hierarchical nature of this work leaves 
little room for understanding how ‘non-elites’ discuss, redefine and contest security nar-
ratives. Thus, the Copenhagen school cannot offer a conceptualisation of how construc-
tivist notions of security apply outside of the context of the elite. A response has been 
vernacular security studies (Bubandt, 2005; Jarvis, 2019) which consider the voice of 
non-elite actors within constructivist security equations.
Vernacular security brings ‘lay’ actors into the equation, offering insights into how 
security is constructed through local idioms. This, however, does not allow for concep-
tualisation of key differentiating factors within the democratised landscape of social 
media and inequalities of influence; insights from social media enable us to begin to 
understand how some vernacular security speak is ‘more equal’ than others. Social media 
presents constructivist security scholars with a theatre of study sitting somewhere 
between the ‘flat’ plane of vernacular and hierarchical notions of the Copenhagen school 
in that, while anyone theoretically can ‘speak’ security on social media, only a few will 
become influential doing so. This article intervenes in this understudied field posing the 
research question ‘How do security influencers emerge on social media?’ So, this article 
contributes to understandings of constructivist security through analysing social media 
outputs to understand who is influential in the security debate and how. Working at the 
intersection of ‘flat’ vernacular and ‘hierarchical’ Copenhagen School understandings of 
security it identifies mechanisms of security influencers’ rise to prominence, speaking to 
the reality of the social media landscape that renders security speak neither radically flat 
nor rigidly hierarchical. This enables incorporation of notions of non-elite actors speak-
ing security in ways that enable novel theoretical insights for both schools of critical 
security.
Answering this question requires an innovative approach applying concepts and tools 
used to identify social media influencers from digital marketing literature, where they are 
seen existing in competition and coexistence with professional media (Del Fresno García 
et al. 2016). In addition, they are considered influential through self-branding and (Khamis 
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et al., 2017) and acquired influencer capital (Freberg et al., 2011). This article problema-
tises constructivist understandings of who does security speak but also notions that an 
influencer has to have become established and acquired capital with several influencers 
identified having no prior influence before becoming key in driving the debate.
Conceptualising Manchester and security challenges on 
social media
This article seeks to intervene within constructivist debates on security and thus requires 
grounding in both hierarchical theory such as the Copenhagen School and flatter 
Vernacular security studies discussion. This demonstrates how neither hierarchical nor 
flat theories accurately account for differentiation of actors’ influence when speaking 
about security on social media. To account for this question of influence and allow us to 
typologise the security influencer, we must also account for digital marketing literature 
considering social influence and influencers. It is also important to consider implications 
that specifics of this study have for ongoing discussions within the Critical Terrorism 
Studies field that foreground constructivist dimensions of such events. Finally, 
Manchester occurred within, and gave renewed impetus to debates about the place of 
Muslims in British society and the wider integration debate.
Challenging constructivist understandings of security
Constructivist understandings of security are well established. The Copenhagen school of 
(de)securitisation made the central important observation for this study that security is a 
domain not of ‘objective’ realities, but rather ‘subjective’ constructions created through 
narratives (Inter alia Buzan et al., 1997). This has implications because successful ‘secu-
ritisation’ of a subject as a threat moves them from ‘normal’ to emergency politics (Buzan 
et al., 1997). Constructivist notions of security are not a panacea; indeed, they have failed 
in normative missions to de-construct issues back into realms of normal politics (to ‘de-
securitise’) (Coskun, 2011; Rumelili, 2013). This has relevance to construction of Muslim 
minorities during terror events because of the intersection of an individual perpetrated 
episode of insecurity ostensibly in the name of a religion which has become widely used, 
even if as a homogenising and extremely problematic label to denote a diverse minority 
diaspora group. Thus, existence of collective nouns such as ‘Muslims’ denotes common-
ality and homogeneity running contrary to de-construction and nuancing group identity, 
and further to de-constructing notions of security threats (Roe, 2004).
While considering questions of how social media influence relates to construction of 
terror threats, it is worth pausing to question ‘who’ does this constructivism. The 
Copenhagen school is elite focused, where the security elite is situated to do the con-
struction through authority endowed actors that speak security (Buzan et al., 1997). 
Critiques have emerged of the voicelessness of those excluded from elite focused con-
versations (McDonald, 2008) and the insecurity of silence (Hansen, 2000) created.
These critiques have found a response through ‘vernacular’ security studies (Inter alia 
Jarvis and Lister, 2013; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016) which have made inroads 
in conceptualising how everyday discussions of security occur away from the historically 
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privileged state elites of the Copenhagen School. Yet, ‘vernacular’ conceptualises ways 
security is constructed in everyday terms and privileges the plurality of ways security is 
practised, requiring context specific understanding of idioms of uncertainty and fear about 
global, national and/or local security concerns (Bubandt, 2005; Jarvis and Lister, 2013). 
Thus, vernacular security prioritises stories of marginalised groups within global politics 
and seeks to understand how ‘citizens . . . construct and describe experiences of security 
and insecurity in their own vocabularies, cultural repertoires’ (Croft and Vaughan-
Williams, 2017). Coming without conceptions of what security is or should be, provides 
vernacular security studies with a theoretical ‘emptiness’ allowing for truly inductive 
insights into public experience, understanding and anxiety (Jarvis, 2019). These theoreti-
cal insights provide space for a fusion of security literature with social media influence 
and what we can learn from how new media technologies present a context; within these 
security can be discussed by everyday actors where these themselves become influential. 
Bringing marketing knowledge to security: the ‘Influencer’
This research will nuance a definition of the social media security influencer. Influencers 
are primarily considered within marketing (Gorry and Westbrook, 2009) as representing 
independent third-party endorsers shaping audience attitudes through shared online con-
tent. Although there have been significant academic definition influencers (Bakshy et al., 
2011) and quantifying influence (Anger and Kittl, 2011), there is a little consideration of 
typologies (Au-Yong-Oliveira et al., 2019).
Within this research social media enables the security ‘layman’ to act as a security 
influencer. As discussed, the influencer concept comes from marking and has been 
used to describe emergence of an independent actors who shapes attitudes through 
social media in competition/coexistence with ‘professional media’ (Del Fresno García 
et al., 2016). The term ‘influence’ has been applied to highly organised leveraging of 
social media to cultivate neo-liberal individualist ‘self-branding’ (Khamis et al., 
2017) and production of ‘Social media influencer capital’ through third-party endorse-
ment (Freberg et al., 2011) shaping audience perceptions. Influencers with the highest 
potential influence identified within this article are not organised in creating an indi-
vidual ‘security brand’ to cultivate influence, instead taking micro or nano ‘security’ 
influencer form (Au-Yong-Oliveira et al., 2019). As such, although they do corre-
spond with the influencer definition in providing third-party content production and 
endorsement of discourse of security and they are neither traditional state security 
elite nor self-affiliating with a terror group or vector of insecurity. In this case, their 
influence emerges through engagement with content by followers and messages 
shared and from their established platforms which they have previously used for often 
different purposes.
This dovetails with observations that security has bled into practice and vernacular 
of daily life through routine data collection and CCTV operation (Huysmans, 2011) 
immersing individuals in constant engagement with security. Here, the security/tech-
nology nexus becomes increasingly important not simply as something which surveys 
and monitors individuals, but democratises abilities to subvert, re-make and challenge 
dominant narratives and constructions of events.
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Influencing constructivist understandings of terrorism
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) emphasises constructivist dimensions inherent in sub-
jective, dynamic, social and political factors contributing to understandings of terror 
(Gunning and Jackson, 2011). These observations have emerged from critique of empiri-
cal, conceptual and ontological weaknesses in conventional terrorism studies (inter alia 
Gunning, 2007; Jackson et al., 2007). Essentially, CTS argues the importance of fore-
grounding constructions of terrorism embedded in political and ideological debates, 
competitions and concerns (Gunning, 2007; Jarvis, 2009). Thus, here the broader discur-
sive dimensions of terrorism are shaped not in a vacuum, but in dialogue with, and influ-
enced by, political, ideological and power concerns. This has spawned enquiry into the 
cultural dimensions’ terrorism takes in contemporary times where it is increasingly part 
of life (Erickson, 2008). Furthermore, current scholarship on ‘hard’ aspects of the Internet 
where extremism/dissent can spread through ‘electronic-jihad’ (Aly et al., 2016) also 
presents valuable insights through which to expand on cultural, social and local means 
through which terrorism and security are discussed and constructed. Thus, this study will 
offer insight into how varying types of security speak contribute to constructivist dimen-
sions of events, such as Manchester.
Manchester and British Muslims
Post-event initial reaction on social media relied on stereotyping creating temporary anti-
immigrant sentiment (Cappiali et al., 2018). Furthermore, ‘liked’ messages generally 
contained emotive/human content, both positive and negative in nature (Zhao and Zhan 
2019). While framing varied by media outlet (Nazmi, 2018), Manchester was typical in 
that anger, rather than fear, typified public response (Roach et al., 2020), yet also raised 
questions about radicalisation (Hedges, 2017).
These observations echo ongoing debates about security and British Muslims stretching 
back to the Iranian Revolution and the Satanic Verses scandal (Modood, 2006). However, in 
post-9/11 times, British Muslims are increasingly situated as existential threats to UK liberal 
political and social order (Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2002; Saeed, 2007; Sian et al., 2012). 
Coverage focuses on recurring concerns of terror, religious and cultural difference and 
extremism (Moore et al., 2008) with two-thirds during this period situating Muslims as a 
threat and/or problem (Abbas, 2004; Moore et al., 2008). This has stripped British Muslim 
agency; they are reported, written about, yet rarely given voice (Ahmed, 2009). Yet, British 
Muslims have conversely exerted agency in social and political representation (Adamson, 
2011; Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins, 2010). Nuancing this further, the British context has 
caused dichotomisation into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ British Muslims with the ‘good’ encouraged 
to denounce the ‘bad’ (Sirin and Fine, 2007), or the ‘good’ requiring coercive liberation from 
the ‘bad’ (Maira, 2009; Mamdani, 2008). In the United Kingdom, such calls to denounce are 
seen within government policy through the prevent strategy (Qurashi, 2018).
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A sequential multi-methods approach to the emergence of 
security influencers
This article seeks to build a typology of security influencers showing the different ways 
they emerge and go on to influence the security debate. The four clusters identified in 
this study have one commonality; they emerge from security obscurity to positions of 
influence. However, they exhibit significant differences in that some are influential in 
other Twitter domains with large numbers of followers while others are more generally 
obscure. In addition, two of the users engage with the questions of Muslims in security 
in ‘secular’ ways discussing Muslims as a social group, while two engage more overtly 
with religion by attempting to delineate Islam as a religion from violent acts of terrorism. 
Building a typology better enables this article to engage with security literature in iden-
tifying mechanisms by which non-security elites become influential within security 
debates in a multiplicity of different ways.
Once Twitter data collection was complete, a multi-methods approach facilitated the 
capturing of these complexities. Multi-methods approaches emerge to answer complex 
social science questions (Greene, 2015) such as the research question posed here. 
Identifying how security influencers emerge cannot be adequately captured using a sin-
gle methodological approach as social network analysis offers insights into structures of 
networks, but fails to capture discursive content; yet, both of these are vital for an under-
standing security speak and who becomes important generating it. However, it is impor-
tant to be specific when adopting a multi-methods approach as their very concept have 
caused significant debate and confusion within the social sciences in past decades in both 
definition and application (Anguera et al., 2018). This article thus draws on an advantage 
of multi-methods approaches; that they can be used in sequence or in parallel and thus do 
not require integrating until results are obtained and inferences can be made (Johnson 
et al., 2007). Thus, this article applies a sequential approach where different, yet compli-
mentary methods are applied in turn to gain overlaying insights to answer how security 
influencers emerge. The sequence and rationale is as follows:
1. Mapping data into a social network graph to identify users who are the most 
influential by betweenness centrality. This gives a structural indication of who is 
influential but does not enable the understanding of on what terms their influence 
is based beyond numerical betweenness centrality scores. Theoretically, this 
demonstrates that neither the Copenhagen school’s (Buzan et al., 1997) hierarchi-
cal, elite notion of security speak captures this current research’s online security 
influencers because none of the four users identified are security elites. It also 
contests vernacular securities’ (Bubandt, 2005) understandings of security speak 
because it demonstrates that the landscape for social media users is not ‘flat’ but 
that hierarchies emerge.
2. The complete networks of the four most influential users are extracted to allow exam-
ination of how they are influential discursively and provide insights into how their 
debate is structured. This required a thematic analysis exploring which key themes 
emerge in response to the most influential users’ initial messages, and in parallel a 
sentiment analysis to see if they agree with or contest the original message.
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Collecting Twitter data about security
The data analysed in this study were a sub-sample of 27,367 tweets for 48 hours running 
from the 21st May 2017 beginning at 10:57:29 p.m. until the 23rd May 2017 at 
9:59:53 a.m., of a larger 96-hour, 187,000 tweet dataset. This was a complete firehose 
application programming interface (API) data, guaranteeing a full sample of non-deleted 
tweets but at cost from the decommissioned ‘texifter’ service. The tweets were collected 
using a keyword search of ‘Manchester’ and ‘Muslim’. Tweets here are reproduced in a 
non-edited form in line with Twitter’s requirements for researchers to re-produce tweets 
in unedited forms.
A sacrifice was use of a signifier of difference, ‘Muslim’, within search terms limiting 
this study to only mentions on Twitter where ‘Muslims’ are referred to by this signifier 
of difference and not neutrally. This has conceptual implications, as Muslims are not just 
reported on as such but are covered in many different ways. Ideally, if data were freely 
available, it would have been beneficial to collect a more general dataset and examine 
discourse and networks where ‘Muslims’ were also covered without this signifier of dif-
ference being mentioned providing a broader picture of discursive constructions.
Using Social Network Analysis to identify security influencers
The first step in understanding how security influencers emerge is to use social network 
analysis (SNA) to define the most influential within the security debate. It is important 
to note here that ‘influential’ does not mean either
1. Simply producing viral tweets that are unconsciously spread; or
2. Influencing real world behaviour.
Rather, influence in this case is about driving debate on social media through engage-
ment which can be agreement or contestation and which requires further analysis steps 
because SNA alone cannot provide us insights into this.
However, SNA can demonstrate who emerges as the most influential within the secu-
rity debate at a particular point in time. Once raw Twitter data were converted to .graphml 
format, the data could be imported into Gephi enabling rendering of large datasets into 
complex ‘sociograms’ where, individuals are represented by points (nodes), and interac-
tions by lines (edges). This enables us to investigate the following:
1. How individuals share messages;
2. How their behaviour forms clusters;
3. The relationships between clusters of messages.
Thus, a fundamental of SNA is examining structural relationships between socially con-
nected actors (Davies, 2009) to understand salience of messages (Ahmed and Lugovic, 
2019). This is important as a first step in understanding how non-elite actors produce 
security speak because SNA gives structure to a dataset and enables visualisation of who 
the influential actors are. This is done through SNA’s ability to classify tweets into 
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‘clusters’ and to see how narratives spread and are contested within these. The value is 
that individual graphs can be extracted from a network and analysed instead of consider-
ing the whole network, valuable when considering network domains (White, 2008). This 
is important in an era of highly polarised politics where it is conceptualised that mes-
sages spread within separate ‘echo chambers’ without intersecting (Guo et al., 2020). 
Thus, the fundamental concern of SNA is to examine what structures relationships 
between individuals (Ahmed et al., 2017; Gardy et al., 2011; Scott, 2017), here with the 
sharing of ideas and narratives between actors and organisations. SNA is limited, how-
ever, because it sites analytical primacy not at the level of the individual, but through 
connections in which they are embedded in (De Nooy et al., 2018). However, using SNA 
overcomes some of these limitations because it offers identification of key ‘influencers’, 
that being, individuals responsible for creating narratives spread by others and thus, the 
most frequently interacted with narratives can be identified.
Figure 1 graphically represents the four principle sub-networks where it can be seen 
how four influential conversations emerge from four separate tweets; these users tweet a 
message that becomes influential in the security debate on Twitter in this 48-hour period. 
Table 1 shows numbers that substantiate these users as the most influential by shares and 
betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality in SNA is a measure within a graph based 
Figure 1. Visualisation of four most influential sub-network structures discussed earlier, 
filtered by betweenness centrality containing 9497 nodes (43.16%) and 9822 conversational 
edges (43.5%); these are in effect the tweets with the highest reach and engagement within the 
network.
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on shortest paths. Within sociograms, with every pair of vertices in a connected graph, 
there will be at least one shortest path; the betweenness centrality for each vertex is the 
number of these shortest paths. In network theory, it is a measure that represents the 
degree to which nodes stand between each other; nodes with higher betweenness central-
ity would have more control over the network, because more information will always 
pass through that node. As such, the nodes detailed in Table 1 with the highest between-
ness centralities demonstrate their capacity to influence.
The SNA also demonstrates how influencers’ conversations have little interaction 
with others; conversations analysed remain discrete and contestation/agreement occur 
within specific clusters without spreading, even though they emerge thematically and are 
empirically similar in message. It is this ability to gain insight into the largest clusters 
that enable the data to be sorted into separate graphs, and analysable datasets, so that the 
mechanics of security influence can be considered in more depth. Thus, the first step in 
analysing how security influencers emerge in more depth is to dissect the narratives 
which emerge within the most influential and important clusters.
Sentiment analysis and contestation as influence
Once SNA revealed the security influencers identity and their clusters of interactions, 
cluster contents were extracted in their entirety using NodeXL (2020) which can extract 
a dataset’s individual Twitter IDs. This provides the data for the next step in the sequen-
tial multi-methods approach to identify how security influencers emerge by agreement/
contestation of their tweets and the content of these agreements/contestations. This aligns 
with a key mission over the past two decades of critical security studies literature to 
understand the content of messages and the terms upon which the security debate is 
structured (Buzan et al., 1997; Jarvis and Lister, 2013).
The first step in this was to analyse the agreement/contestation of the original security 
influencers’ message. All four actors who emerged as highly influential in the debate in 
the 48 hours following the bombing expressed similar sentiments; that Muslims as a social 
group or Islam as a global religion should be differentiated from those responsible. This 
stirred significant debate within the clusters and drove the importance of the security 
Table 1. Created by the researcher, four highest key-influential sub-networks with the whole 
graph.
Betweenness 
centrality
Content shared Shares 
in graph
@emilypriceman 702 https://Twitter.com/emilypriceman/
status/866910510905741313
3543
@nhkindness 306 https://Twitter.com/nhkindness/
status/866879413236924417
2734
@spookyaly 1332 https://Twitter.com/SpookyAly/
status/866968537763651585
2417
@themanutdway 90 https://Twitter.com/TheManUtdWay/
status/866803692644782080
1402
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influencers in structuring the debate. This was measured using a sentiment analysis which 
methodologically sets out to consider opinion and sentiment towards entities such as a 
product, service, organisation, individual, issue or event and their attributes (Dave et al., 
2003; Nasukawa and Yi, 2003; Turney, 2002). Through this method, classification is 
applied to opinions which express/imply positive or negative sentiments and has been 
applied across disciplines and contexts (Feldman, 2013; Liu, 2012). In this case, it was 
used to determine attitude of a ‘speaker’ (Feldman, 2013) to the influencers’ original tweet 
with every tweet within the four-cluster logged as ‘agree’, ‘contest’ or ‘neutral’.
While sentiment analysis gives an indication of the sentiment of replies vis-à-vis the 
original tweet, it does not offer deeper insights into discursive terms on which the secu-
rity debate is structured and thus does not offer insight into the discursive terms upon 
which security influencers emerge. This required a thematic analysis to define the key 
themes which emerge in the security debate and thus, the themes which drive the influ-
ence of the security influencer. This study chooses to operationalise discourse analysis 
through a thematic analysis approach using the six-step coding process (Fereday, Muir-, 
and Cochrane, 2006). This six-step process involved the following:
1. Familiarisation with data;
2. Generating initial codes;
3. Searching for themes;
4. Reviewing themes;
5. Designing/naming themes;
6. Producing the final report.
This worked well because sentiment analysis enabled the first two steps to be completed, 
these being familiarisation and generating initial codes. This reflective approach is suit-
able because one cannot know the content of a Twitter dataset even when searching with 
specific keywords/hashtags because of the unpredictable nature of how narratives are 
created. This sequential application of three methodologies in a coherent multi-method 
approach enables insights to be gained into the security influencers that would have been 
impossible with a single method.
Passive, active and deeply contested: typologising the 
security influencer
The innovative, sequential multi-methods approach enables this article to build a typology 
of the different ways in which security influencers emerge. Importantly, this moves beyond 
the surface level of identifying the most influential clusters within the network, but also 
identifies the discursive terms upon which the security debate is structured. This is important 
due to conceptualisations in security literature regarding how messages are created and 
spread. As discussed, the Copenhagen School’s hierarchical model advocates that security 
elites are the most important in debate shaping (Buzan et al., 1997), yet, this does not account 
here for emergence of ‘lay’ actors, or those with influencer capital in other areas shaping the 
debate. In addition, ‘flatter’ conceptions of security speak in vernacular security theory 
(Bubandt, 2005; Jarvis, 2019) do not give insight into how disparities of influence occur 
within vernacular security speak on social media. The case studies presented demonstrate 
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that more nuanced understanding of both the nature and production of discourse needs to be 
developed to understand security speak on social media. Within this, a typology emerges 
from this study giving nuance to this discussion as users with little or no influencer capital 
emerge and become influential and then fall back into obscurity. In addition, others pivot 
their influencer capital from unrelated arenas to become temporary security influencers.
Passive security influencers: ‘Security Broadcasters’
The first type of security influencer emerging within the dataset are ‘security broadcast-
ers’. This type of security influencer simply broadcasts a message that becomes influ-
ential without further engagement from the influencer. This is interesting because 
critical security studies conceptualise elite generated security discourse in this way. The 
Copenhagen school sees the elite as in a position of power projecting their security nar-
ratives to the audience (Huysmans, 2011). In this respect, we identify that non-security 
elites on social media become influential in ways similar to that of established security 
elites. Here, they project a message to their online audience and do not engage in further 
debate. Within this type, the two users have varying levels of influencer capital, one 
user becoming influential from total obscurity and the other pivoting influencer capital 
from a non-security field. This dovetails in a transient and ephemeral way with unidi-
rectional, hierarchical notions of elite-audience relationships in the Copenhagen school 
(Buzan et al., 1997). Thus, the security broadcaster demonstrates a paradoxical relation-
ship to the notion of the increased democratisation of security speak in that an actor can 
create and broadcast a message which can be contested, yet does not reply.
The first broadcaster, @EmilyPriceMan tweets a message (Figure 2) that constructs 
the Muslim community in ‘banal’ terms (Downing, 2019) as everyday actors playing roles 
in society as ‘taxi drivers, police officers, doctors’, supporting the victims of the attack.
Here, Emily becomes influential by positioning herself in oppositions to dominant 
narratives within the United Kingdom situating Muslims and Islam as security threats 
(Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2002). As CTS argue that terrorism has become a feature of 
everyday life (Erickson, 2008), this clear situation within the debate demonstrates that 
actors who become influential demonstrate a literacy in dominant debates about terror. 
Thus, we see here that lay actors can become important in the security debate by 
Figure 2. Content shared by @emilypriceman https://Twitter.com/emilypriceman/
status/866910510905741313.
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opposing dominant narratives that hint at new media offering the ability of alternative 
voices to emerge on security issues that can be influential within the debate. Within this, 
Emily rises to prominence by seeking to make claims about the ‘banality’ of Muslims as 
social actors akin to non-Muslims in fulfilling important social functions. This theme has 
emerged in other social media constructions of terror attacks that have resulted in Muslim 
victimhood (Downing, 2019) where users have sought to attach Muslim minorities to the 
broader national narrative. This discourse of banality, while contested, meets with major-
ity agreement (Table 2 presents a summary of discourse by theme).
Agreement by users who engage with the original tweet (45% of total engagement) 
continues in this vein in seeking to de-construct these dominant notions of Muslims as 
security threats (Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2002; Saeed, 2007; Sian et al., 2012). Other 
users agree by specifically pointing to examples of mass violence, such as the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) bombings of Manchester, to highlight that non-Muslims also 
engage in terrorism.
A significant number of users also contest the notions expressed in the original tweet 
(36% of total engagements). Within these, they engage with the broader debates about 
Muslims as security threats and Islam as a vector of global violence in diametrically 
opposing ways, repeating tropes about Islam being violent and committing acts of gen-
dered oppression (Allen, 2010; Figure 3).
Table 2. Summary of discourse for @EmilyPriceman.
Code: @EmilyPriceman Explanation Tweet tally %
Total sample – 298 100
Sentiment agree – 128 45% of total
Islam/Muslim non-violent Use of Islamic doctrine or examples 
to show Islam/Muslims not violent
58 46
Simple agreement ‘I agree’ 38 30
Nuancing terror and 
identity
Examples of White/Christian or 
other religion terrorism
25 20
Media Media to blame for negative image 
of Muslims
3 2
Mourning Agree but mourning victims more 
important than discussion
3 2
Sentiment disagree – 108 36% of total
Muslims are terrorists In part of full Muslims are terrorist 
even if an extreme element
53 49
Islamic religion inherently 
violent
Reference to specific scripture or 
general sentiment
28 26
Simple disagreement ‘I disagree’ 13 12
Mourning Disagree but mourning victims 
more important than discussion
11 10
Anti-immigration Stopping immigration would solve 
problem of terrorism
2 2
Sentiment neutral – 113 19% of total
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Cross-platform broadcaster
The second security influencer demonstrates a different profile; they have existing influ-
encer capital in a non-security domain that they pivot to discussing security. Here, she 
also presents a different argument in seeking to nuance discussions of terror by arguing 
that Islam as a global religion is not the cause of violence (Figure 4). Once again, she 
seeks to situate herself outside of the dominant discursive UK context where Islam and 
Muslims are securitised (Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2002), demonstrating a literacy with 
key debates about terrorism in the United Kingdom and globally.
Here, @nhkindness’ original tweet takes a different thematic tact form the first secu-
rity broadcaster in that her message engages not with the banality of Muslims as a social 
group but with Islam as a religion in a larger global context (Figure 4).
This produces a different response with 56% of engagements disagreeing with the 
original tweet (Table 3).
The disagreement (Figure 5) aligns closely with the dominant discursive UK context 
that Islam is a problematic religion and Muslims a security threat (Moore et al., 2008; 
Figure 3. Response to @EmilyPricema.
Figure 4. Content shared by @nhkindness http://Twitter.com/nhkindness/
statuses/866879413236924417.
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Figure 5. Example response to content shared by @nhkindness http://Twitter.com/
nhkindness/statuses/866879413236924417.
Table 3. Summary of discourse for @nhkindness.
Code: @nhkindness Explanation Tweet tally %
Total sample – 220 100
Sentiment agree – 50 23% of total
Simple agreement ‘I agree’ 23 47
Islam/Muslim  
non-violent
Use of Islamic doctrine or examples 
to show Islam/Muslims not violent
16 32
Nuancing terror and 
identity
Examples of White/Christian or 
other religion terrorism
9 19
Mourning Agree but mourning victims more 
important than discussion
1 2
Sentiment disagree – 123 56% of total
Islamic religion 
inherently violent
Reference to specific scripture or 
general sentiment
42 34
Muslims are terrorists In part of full Muslims are terrorist 
even if an extreme element
39 32
Simple disagreement ‘I disagree’ 25 20
Anti-Liberals/Liberalism ‘Liberals are the problem’ 14 12
Anti-immigration Stopping immigration would solve 
problem of terrorism
2 2
Sentiment neutral – 47 21% of total
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Table 4. Summary of discourse for @SpookyAly.
Code: SpookyAly Explanation Tweet tally %
Total sample – 267 100
Sentiment agree – 62 23% of total
Islam/Muslim non-
violent
Use of Islamic doctrine or examples 
to show Islam/Muslims not violent
38 61
Nuancing terror and 
identity
Examples of White/Christian or 
other religion terrorism
15 24
Simple agreement ‘I agree’ 9 15
Sentiment disagree – 163 61% of total
Muslims are 
terrorists
In part of full Muslims are terrorist 
even if an extreme element
83 51
Islamic religion 
inherently violent
Reference to specific scripture or 
general sentiment
50 31
Simple disagreement ‘I disagree’ 28 16
Anti-immigration Stopping immigration would solve 
problem of terrorism
3 2
Sentiment neutral – 42 16% of total
Poole, 2002). Thus, the discursive shift the influencer makes towards discussions of 
religion and not a local social group generates more disagreement and problematic 
responses. Structuring this discussion around religion and violence generates a theme not 
seen in secular discussions of Muslims as a social group; an overt discussion of ‘liberals’ 
and ‘liberalism’ as a problem and a key driver of terrorism. This echoes Alt-Right dis-
course (Michelsen and De Orellana, 2019) promoting illiberal political, different social 
norms and migration as solutions to terrorism. CTS argue that terrorism is constructed by 
security elites drawing on social and political factors (Gunning and Jackson, 2011). The 
structure of this disagreement shows that this is also true of social media users who bring 
in larger discussions about liberal politics into the security debate.
Active security influencers: the ‘Security Engagers’
Further topologising the different forms and mechanisms through which security influ-
encers emerge uncovers security influencers that behave differently. They are not acting 
simply like traditional security elites conceptualised by the Copenhagen school (Buzan 
et al., 1997) who ‘broadcast’ their message to the audience, but rather they engage further 
with responses to their messages on social media. The first user has no prior social media 
influence in any particular domain yet rises to prominence within the debate by engaging 
with broader global debates about Islam specifically as a religion and not with Muslims 
as a local, banal, social group (Table 4). This can be seen in the text and photo tweeted 
by the user articulating the sentiment that the individual responsible for the attack “was 
a monster not a Muslim” (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Content shared by @SpookyAly https://Twitter.com/SpookyAly/
status/866968537763651585.
Analogous to the second security broadcaster, whose message about religion met 
with majority contestation, this engagers’ discussion of religion meets with majority 
contestation (61%). Similar to the previous religious message of the security broad-
caster, contestation is centred on dominant tropes of Muslims as terrorists and Islam 
as violent (Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2002). The user engages with this contestation 
and attempts to provide further evidence for their position, in this case, using tweets 
from other social media users (Figure 7). Here, this security influencer’s behaviour is 
more like vernacular theories of security where social media users engage in a ‘flat-
ter’ exchange.
Significant in this discussion is that the security influencer continues to debate, engag-
ing in countering comments negative towards Muslims and Islam, for example Figure 7.
Yet, continued input structured around external empirical evidence does not aid in 
gaining traction for a particular message. Neither does (Figure 7) making a discursive 
shift towards depicting Muslims in banal terms as a social group away from religion.
The cross-platform engager
As seen earlier in the discussion of security broadcasters who use existing social media 
influence capital from another domain to become influential in the security debate, a 
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Figure 7. Response and interaction with content shared by @SpookyAly https://Twitter.com/
SpookyAly/status/866968537763651585.
similar trend occurs with security engagers. In this case, a Manchester United fan account 
with significant existing influence in the domain of sports pivots to engage in the security 
debate. This influencer couches discussion of Muslims in banal, local, social roles and 
specifically counter addresses abuses to Muslims in Manchester (Figure 8).
This banal message seeks to situate discussions about Muslims in the immediate 
local, human context of Manchester as non-violent seeking to differentiate their message 
from the dominant discursive context of the United Kingdom where Muslims are securi-
tised (Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2002). This meets with majority agreement (53%) in 
line with the previous influencers’ tweet that took banal, social approaches (Table 5).
Interestingly, a theme of agreement explicitly connects terrorism and Muslim roles to 
larger nuancing of relationships between terror and identity; Manchester was victim of 
IRA attacks, which has not resulted in collective blaming of the Catholic population. 
Here, users are specifically engaging with labelling and construction of terror events 
central to critical terrorism studies (Gunning and Jackson, 2011); thus, this opens up the 
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Table 5. Summary of discourse for @TheManUtdWay.
Code: TheManUtdWay Explanation Tweet tally %
Total sample – 57 100
Sentiment agree – 20 53% of total
Simple agreement ‘I agree’ 14 52
Islam/Muslim non-
violent
Use of Islamic doctrine or examples 
to show Islam/Muslims not violent
5 18
Nuancing terror and 
identity
Examples of White/Christian or 
other religion terrorism
11 18
Sentiment disagree – 15 26% of total
Muslims are terrorists In part of full Muslims are terrorist 
even if an extreme element
8 53
Simple disagreement ‘I disagree’ 3 26
Islamic religion 
inherently violent
Reference to specific scripture or 
general sentiment
1 7
Mourning Disagree but mourning victims 
more important than discussion
1 7
Anti-immigration Stopping immigration would solve 
problem of terrorism
1 7
Sentiment neutral – 12 21% of total
Figure 8. Content shared by @TheManUtdWay http://Twitter.com/TheManUtdWay/
statuses/866803692644782080.
possibility of a larger dialogue between CTS and vernacular security studies in how eve-
ryday voices conceive of, and construct, terrorism. @TheManUtdWay engages with the 
conversation rebutting anti-Muslim sentiment (Figure 9).
This brings further users into the debate, prompting discussions of Muslim victims 
within the attack, juxtaposed with perpetrators of violence. This is an explicit attempt to 
re-construct the meaning of the violent act to engage with the social and cultural context 
of terrorism (Gunning and Jackson, 2011). Here, Muslims are not just perpetrators of 
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violence, or banal social actors who are first responders, but also victims of violence 
overtly perpetrated in the name of their religion.
Conclusion
This article sought to account for the emergence of security influencers through building 
a typology of their activities on social media. This engaged with conceptions of the struc-
tured and hierarchical Copenhagen School and less structured, flatter vernacular security 
studies literature to understand how security speak on social media is neither flat, nor 
rigidly hierarchical. Rather, social media exhibits dynamic properties of both in unpre-
dictable ways. In particular, it is important to note here that none of the four influencers 
have previous security field experience yet influence the debate. The influence is also 
ephemeral; security influencers and the unlikely individuals becoming important struc-
turing security speak on social media rise from positions of security obscurity and in two 
cases from positions of having little existing influence on social media. Essentially for 
48 hours after the Manchester bombing, the four most influential actors, and four most 
active conversations about Muslims were created and structured by actors without secu-
rity credentials, expertise nor influence in political, social or security arenas.
This study also aimed to demonstrate the contested nature of even influential security 
speech on social media and that contestation is an important contributing factor to the 
influence of the security broadcaster. Thus, it is not because one is unanimously or even 
migratorially agreed with that they become influential. Indeed, in part, these messages 
become influential, because they are contested, because contestation is an important part 
of engagement making the message more visible and driving engagement. A difference 
emerges when one considers ways in which these influencers structure discussions of the 
place of Muslims in light of Manchester. The two formulating messages situating 
Figure 9. Example response to content shared by @TheManUtdWay http://Twitter.com/
TheManUtdWay/statuses/866803692644782080.
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Muslims in ‘banal’ everyday roles receive higher degrees of agreement. These messages 
connect Muslims to the local context and not initially to the global religion Islam or 
Muslims as a global social group. This is significant, offering insight into ways margin-
alisation of Muslims is considered and benefits in high-security contexts of focusing on 
local opportunities for structuring identities.
The contestation of this security speak offers important insights for how debates about 
terrorism, security and Muslims are structured. Importantly, becoming an influencer 
does not mean you are agreed with and terms of disagreement are enlightening. The 
micro-discourse mirrors ongoing social and political debate about terrorism, security and 
integration. Emergence of an anti-Liberalism discourse is interesting although only in 
one conversation, demonstrating that while illiberal, alt-right, discourse emerges, it is of 
fairly small magnitude. Far more common is discourse around Islam and Muslims being 
inherently violent and Islam and liberal society irreconcilability as common themes 
emerging through all contestation across all actors. An important area of agreement is 
couched in terms nuancing terrorism and identity with the example of the IRA bombings 
and how the city’s ethnic and religious mix was not disrupted by previous sectarian vio-
lence, or were particular communities punished for being co-religionists with terrorists.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/ 
or publication of this article: This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 
2020 research and innova- tion programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement 
No 703613H2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions [703613].
ORCID iD
Joseph Downing  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7173-8043
References
Abbas T (2004) After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims, Islamophobia, multiculturalism, and the 
State. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21: 26–38.
Adamson F (2011) Engaging or contesting the liberal state? ‘Muslim’ as a politicised identity 
category in. Europe, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37: 6.
Ahmed S (2009) Seen and Not Heard. Leicester: Policy Research Centre.
Ahmed W, Bath PA and Demartini G (2017) Using Twitter as a data source: an overview of 
ethical, legal, and methodological challenges. In: Woodfield K (ed) The Ethics of Online 
Research. Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing Limited, pp. 79–107. 
Ahmed W and Lugovic S (2019) Social media analytics: analysis and visualisation of news diffu-
sion using NodeXL. Online Information Review 43(1), 149–160.
Allen C (2010) Fear and loathing: the political discourse in relation to Muslims and Islam in the 
British contemporary setting. Politics and Religion Journal 4(2): 221–236.
Aly A, Macdonald S, Jarvis L, et al. (2016) Grasping at thin air. In: Violent Extremism Online: New 
Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet. London: Taylor and Francis. Available at: https://
www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781317431886/chapters/10.4324/9781315692029-9
Anger I and Kittl C (2011) Measuring influence on Twitter. In: Proceedings of the 11th interna-
tional conference on knowledge management and knowledge technologies, pp. 1–4. Available 
at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2024288.2024326
Downing and Dron 21
Anguera M, Blanco-Villaseñor A, Losada J, et al. (2018) Revisiting the difference between mixed 
methods and multimethods: is it all in the name? Quality & Quantity 52: 2757–2770.
Au-Yong-Oliveira M, Cardoso AS, Goncalves M, et al. (2019) Strain effect – a case study about 
the power of nano-influencers. In: 2019 14th Iberian conference on information systems 
and technologies (CISTI), pp. 1–5. IEEE. Available at: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/docu-
ment/8760911.
Bakshy E, Hofman JM, Mason WA, et al. (2011) Everyone’s an influencer: quantifying influence 
on Twitter. In: Proceedings of the fourth ACM international conference on web search and 
data mining, pp. 65–74. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221520053_
Everyone’s_an_Influencer_Quantifying_Influence_on_Twitter
Bubandt N (2005) Vernacular security: the politics of feeling safe in global, national and local 
worlds. Security Dialogue 36(3): 275–296.
Buzan B, Waever O and de Wilde J (1997) Security: A New Framework for Analysis. UK ed. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Cappiali M, Mancosu M and Pereira MF (2018) The (non)-persistence of changes of attitudes 
toward immigrants’ after terrorist attacks: the case of the Manchester bombings. Carlo 
Alberto Notebooks 549(549). Available at: http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/b505e62d-b029-42b8-
9a1d-ab467fe76bbc
Coskun BB (2011) Analysing Desecuritisation: The Case of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace 
Education and Water Management. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Available at: https://
www.amazon.co.uk/Analysing-Desecuritisation-Israeli-Palestinian-Education-Management/
dp/1443827312
Croft S and Vaughan-Williams N (2017) Fit for purpose? Fitting ontological security studies ‘into’ 
the discipline of international relations: towards a vernacular turn. Cooperation and Conflict 
52(1): 12–30.
Dave K, Lawrence S and Pennock DM (2003) Mining the peanut gallery: opinion extraction 
and semantic classification of product reviews. In: Proceedings of the 12th international 
conference on World Wide Web, pp. 519–528. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/2904559_Mining_the_Peanut_Gallery_Opinion_Extraction_and_Semantic_
Classification_of_Product_Reviews
Davies R (2009) The use of social network analysis tools in the evaluation of social change 
communications. Communication for Social Change Consortium. Available at: https://
richardjdavies.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/the-use-of-social-network-analysis-tools-in-the-
evaluation-of-social-change-communications-c.pdf
De Nooy W, Mrvar A and Batagelj V (2018) Exploratory Social Network Analysis With Pajek: 
Revised and Expanded Edition for Updated Software, vol. 46. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Del Fresno García M, Daly A and Sánchez-Cabezudo JSS (2016) Identifying the new influ-
ences in the Internet era: social media and social network analysis. Identificando a Los 
Nuevos Influyentes En Tiempos de Internet: Medios Sociales y Análisis de Redes Sociales 
153: 23–40.
Downing J (2019) Blurring European and Islamic values or brightening the good – bad Muslim 
dichotomy? A critical analysis of French Muslim victims of jihadi terror online on Twitter 
and in Le Monde Newspaper. Critical Studies on Terrorism 12(2): 250–272.
Erickson CW (2008) Thematics of counterterrorism: comparing 24 and MI-5/Spooks. Critical 
Studies on Terrorism 1(3): 343–358.
Feldman R (2013) Techniques and applications for sentiment analysis. Communications of the 
ACM 56(4): 82–89.
22 new media & society 00(0)
Fereday J and Muir-Cochrane E (2006) Demonstrating rigor using thematic analysis: a hybrid 
approach of inductive and deductive coding and theme development. International Journal 
of Qualitative Methods 5(1): 1–11.
Freberg J, Graham K, McGaughey K, et al. (2011) Who are the social media influencers? A study 
of public perceptions of personality. Public Relations Review 37(1): 90–92.
Gardy JL, Johnston JC, Sui SJH, et al. (2011) Whole-genome sequencing and social-network 
analysis of a tuberculosis outbreak. New England Journal of Medicine 364(8): 730–739.
Gorry GA and Westbrook RA (2009) Winning the Internet confidence game. Corporate Reputation 
Review 12(3): 195–203.
Greene J (2015) Preserving distinctions within the multimethod and mixed methods research 
merger. In: Hesse-Biber SN and Johnson B (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Multimethod 
and Mixed Methods Research Inquiry. Oxford, UK: Oxford Handbooks. DOI: 10.1093/
oxfordhb/9780199933624.013.37.
Gunning J (2007) A case for critical terrorism studies? Government and Opposition 42(3): 363–393.
Gunning J and Jackson R (2011) What’s so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’. Critical Studies 
on Terrorism 4: 369–388.
Guo LA, Rohde J and Wu HD (2020) Who is responsible for Twitter’s echo chamber problem? 
Evidence from 2016 US election networks. Information, Communication & Society 23(2): 
234–251.
Hansen L (2000) The little mermaid’s silent security dilemma and the absence of gender in the 
Copenhagen School| the consortium on gender, security and human rights. Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 29(2): 285–306.
Hedges P (2017) What is (wrong with) radicalisation? A response to Manchester bombing. 
Available at: https://dr.ntu.edu.sg//handle/10356/83176
Huysmans J (2011) What’s in an act? On security speech acts and little security nothings. Security 
Dialogue 42(4–5): 371–383.
Jackson R, Gunning J and Breen-Smyth M (2007) Introduction: the case for a critical terrorism 
studies. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31934822_Introduction_
The_case_for_critical_terrorism_studies
Jarvis L (2009) The spaces and faces of critical terrorism studies. Security Dialogue 40(1): 5–27. 
DOI: 10.1177/0967010608100845.
Jarvis L (2019) Toward a vernacular security studies: origins, interlocutors, contributions, and 
challenges. International Studies Review 21(1): 107–126.
Jarvis L and Lister M (2013) Vernacular securities and their study: a qualitative analysis and 
research agenda. International Relations 27(2): 158–179.
Johnson RB, Onwuegbuzie AJ and Turner LA (2007) Toward a definition of mixed methods 
research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research 1(2), 112–133.
Kahani-Hopkins V and Hopkins N (2010) ‘Representing’ British Muslims: the strategic dimension 
to identity construction. Studies 25(2): 288–309.
Khamis S, Ang L and Welling R (2017) Self-branding, ‘Micro-Celebrity’ and the rise of social 
media influencers. Celebrity Studies 8(2): 191–208.
Liu B (2012) Sentiment analysis and opinion mining. Synthesis Lectures on Human Language 
Technologies 5(1): 1–167.
McDonald M (2008) Securitization and the construction of security. European Journal of 
International Relations 14(4): 563–587.
Maira S (2009) ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Muslim citizens: feminists, terrorists, and U. S. orientalisms. 
Feminist Studies 35(3): 631–656.
Downing and Dron 23
Mamdani M (2008) Good Muslim, bad Muslim: a political perspective on culture and terrorism. 
American Anthropologist 104(3): 766–775.
Michelsen N and De Orellana P (2019) Discourses of resilience in the US alt-right. Resilience 
7(3): 271–287.
Modood T (2006) British Muslims and the Politics of Multiculturalism in Modood T, 
Triandafyllidou A and Zapata-barrero R. London: Taylor and Francis.
Moore K, Mason P and Lewis J (2008) Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation of British 
Muslims in the National Print News Media 2000–2008. Cardiff: Cardiff School of Journalism, 
Media and Cultural Studies.
Nasukawa T and Yi J (2003) Sentiment analysis: capturing favorability using natural language 
processing. In: Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on knowledge capture, 
pp. 70–77. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/945645.945658
Nazmi NFM (2018) Discourse analysis on international online news reports of Manchester bomb-
ing. International Journal of Asian Social Science 8(9): 660–668.
NodeXL (2020) Your social network analysis tool for social media. Available at: https://www.
smrfoundation.org/nodexl/ (accessed 29 June 2020).
Poole E (2002) Reporting Islam: Media Representation and British Muslims. London: IB Tauras.
Qurashi F (2018) The prevent strategy and the UK ‘War on Terror’: embedding infrastructures of 
surveillance in Muslim communities. Palgrave Communications 4(1): 17.
Roach J, Cartwright A and Pease K (2020) More angry than scared? A study of public reactions 
to the Manchester arena and London bridge terror attacks of 2017. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, May. Taylor and Francis Ltd. Available at: https://pure.hud.ac.uk/en/publications/
more-angry-than-scared-a-study-of-public-reactions-to-the-manches
Roe P (2004) Securitization and minority rights: conditions of desecuritization. Security Dialogue 
35(3): 279–294. DOI: 10.1177/0967010604047527.
Rumelili B (2013) Identity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical 
security. Journal of International Realtions and Development 18: 52–74.
Saeed A (2007) Media, racism and islamophobia: the representation of Islam and Muslims in the 
media. Sociology Compass 1(2): 443–462.
Scott J (2017) Social Network Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Sian K, Law I and Sayyid S (2012) The Media and Muslims in the UK, working paper, Centre 
for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, University of Leeds March 2012. Available at: https://
ces.uc.pt/projectos/tolerace/media/Working%20paper%205/The%20Media%20and%20
Muslims%20in%20the%20UK.pdf. 
Sirin SR and Fine M (2007) Hyphenated selves: Muslim American youth negotiating identities on 
the fault lines of global conflict. Applied Developmental Science 11(3): 151–163.
Turney PD (2002) Thumbs up or thumbs down? Semantic orientation applied to unsupervised 
classification of reviews. Arxiv Preprint. Available at: https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/
P02-1053.pdf
Vaughan-Williams N and Stevens D (2016) Vernacular theories of everyday (in)security: the dis-
ruptive potential of non-elite knowledge. Security Dialogue 47(1): 40–58.
White HC (2008) Identity and Control: How Social Formations Emerge. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Zhao X and Zhan MM (2019) Appealing to the heart: how social media communication charac-
teristics affect users’ liking behavior during the Manchester terrorist attack. International 
Journal of Communication 13: 22.
24 new media & society 00(0)
Author biographies
Joseph Downing is LSE fellow Nationalism in the European Institute, London School of Economics 
and Political Science. Previously, he was Marie-Curie fellow, Laboratoire méditerranéen de soci-
ologie, CNRS Université Aix-Marseille, France and the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London, UK. He is author of “French Muslims in Perspective: Nationalism, Post-
Colonialism and Marginalisation Under the Republic” with Palgrave Macmillan.
Richard Dron is a lecturer in Digital Business at the University of Salford Business School. He 
leads their academic research cluster for data analytics. He is currently working extensively with 
industry on ERDF funded projects increasing the capacity and awareness of business key-decision 
makers of Artificial Intelligence and Data Science.
